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1. INTRODUCTION 
International maritime piracy is a growing phenomenon, particularly in its disruption 
of the main trade route linking Europe and Asia. According to the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC), in 2009 Somali pirates hijacked 47 vessels, took 867 crewmembers 
hostage and carried out no less than 217 violent attacks on ships. All this took place after 
the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution authorizing the 
deployment of a sizeable naval force in the region to protect ships and their crews. From 
an economic standpoint, piracy affects international trade through an increase in 
insecurity regarding the prompt delivery of transported goods.  
Recent research has dealt with various sources of insecurity (corruption, piracy, 
terrorism) by modelling the long-term effect insecurity has on trade (Anderson 2008; 
Anderson and Bandiera 2006; Anderson and Marcouiller 2002, 2005).   Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) have made the point that inadequate institutions constrain trade far 
more than tariffs do. Empirical analysis in this area has focused on the impact of violent 
acts such as terrorism, civil wars and external conflicts on trade (Nitsch and Schumacher, 
2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2004; Mirza and Verdier, 2008; De Sousa, Mirza and Verdier, 
2009; Gassebner, Keck and Teh 2010). In this paper, we focus on the impact of maritime 
piracy on trade. The main advantage in doing this is that it allows us to cover a gap in the 
literature by addressing violent acts in third-SDUW\FRXQWULHV¶ZDWHUVDV0LU]DDQG9HUGLHU
(2008) suggested.  
Maritime economists (Bendall, 2010; Fu et al., 2010) have recently addressed the 
impact of maritime piracy on the cost of maritime trade. The main difference in relation 
to these two papers is our methodology which is based on the gravity model of trade (as 
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opposed to the demand for shipping services model). Moreover, our results allow us to 
compare loss of trade due to Somali piracy with that due to Malaccan piracy. As we use 
the same dataset to account for maritime piracy incidents and focus on the same trade 
routes as the abovementioned papers, we provide additional evidence on the costs of 
piracy for trade which may be compared with that already available. A key advantage of 
our methodology is that we can afford to soften some of the stronger assumptions made 
in prior research, as we do not need to parameterize the model. 
Piracy increases the cost of international maritime transport since higher premiums must 
be paid to crews sailing through dangerous waters, and the cost of insuring the goods 
shipped also increases. Alternatively traders can adopt longer and costlier trade routes or 
change to alternative means of transport (products with a high value/weight ratio could 
switch to air-freight). The longer route around the Cape of Good Hope is an option 
considered by maritime companies, but it was not used before 2008, and only very 
scarcely since (Bendall, 2010). 
For the purposes of this paper, we have used data on piracy attacks supplied by the 
International Piracy Center (IPC) and empirical research that increasingly introduces 
accurate measures of insecurity into gravity equations (e. g. Marcouiller, 2000; Anderson 
and Marcouiller, 2002; Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2004; Mirza 
and Verdier, 2008; Blonigen and Wislon 2008; Wilmsmeier and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2010).  
Our aim is twofold: On the one hand we estimate the impact of maritime piracy on 
maritime trade between Europe and Asia using data on incidents of piracy between 1999 
and 2008. In doing, we account for omitted variable biases and control appropriately for 
potential endogeneity between acts of piracy and trade. We also investigate whether there 
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has been any substitution effect between transport modes as a consequence of escalating 
maritime piracy.  
According to our findings, the effect of ten additional vessels hijacked leads to an 11% 
drop in exports and the international trade-related-cost of piracy is estimated at around 
24.5 billion dollars.  
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we review the related literature on 
insecurity and international trade; in section 3 we present the data used and some 
descriptive statistics; in section 4 we outline our model, empirical estimation and our 
main results; in section 5 we discuss the cost of modern maritime piracy for the 
international community and in section 6 we present our conclusions and ideas for further 
research. 
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2. INSECURITY AND TRADE 
It is a widely accepted assumption that insecurity decreases trade opportunities. As 
Anderson (2008) pointed out, most of us lived in a more or less 'predatory world', which 
makes surprising the lack of research into the extent to which trade is reduced by 
insecurity. 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2005), Anderson and Bandiera (2006) and Anderson (2008) 
have modelled theoretically the conditions under which endogenous transactions costs, 
due to criminal activities like piracy, will destroy trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) 
show how difficult it is for countries to abandon autarky and open up to trade when no 
institutions are available to protect transactions. Anderson and Bandiera (2006) 
developed a simple model for contract enforcement carried out by an exogenous agent, 
such as the mafia or private police forces. Anderson (2008) applies the same conceptual 
framework to show how merchants can organize through guilds or granted monopolies to 
protect their transactions.  
Marcouiller (2000) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), have used the gravity model of 
trade to research empirically the extent to which insecurity deters trade. We have chosen 
to follow the same strategy in this paper. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) used 
institutional measures to determine the degree of security enjoyed by a particular country. 
They differentiate between transparency (measures declared to be taken to fight 
insecurity) and enforceability (the measures, among the former, which are actually 
carried out). They found that the more transparency the highest the trade volume. In an 
unpublished paper based on an earlier version of Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), 
Marcouiller (2000) investigates whether insecurity problems affect all type of goods in 
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WKHVDPHIDVKLRQ8VLQJ5DXFK¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQWKDWVSOLWVJRRGVLQWRKRPRJHQRXV
price-referenced goods and differentiated goods, the author finds that insecurity affects 
trade whatever the type of good. When differentiating between contract insecurity and the 
prevalence of crime and theft, however, trade in homogeneous goods appears to be more 
vulnerable to crime and theft, whereas trade in differentiated goods is more sensitive to 
contract insecurity. The variables used by Marcouiller (2000) and Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) measure merchandise security at the start and end points of the 
journey. They do not deal with security failures during the course of the journey, such as 
those involving acts of piracy. This paper addresses this particular issue by using data on 
maritime piracy. 
Refining the analysis initiated by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2004) and Blomberg and Hess (2004), distinguish several types of violent 
acts: terrorism, civil wars, external conflicts, riots and uprisings. They find each of these 
to have a significant negative impact on bilateral trade. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) 
find bilateral trade to drop by 4% if a country experiences a 100% rise in terrorist 
activity, while Bloomberg and Hess (2004) find that a single terrorist attack leads to a 
 GHFOLQH LQ WKDW FRXQWU\¶V ELODWHUDO WUDGH %RWK VWXGLHV FRQFOXGH WKDW H[WHUQDO DQG
internal armed conflicts have a greater impact on trade than terrorism does. Mirza and 
Verdier (2008) and De Sousa, Mirza and Verdier (2009) focus exclusively on terrorist 
activities. The first of these studies highlights the specificities of terrorism and their 
relevance for the strategy used to estimate its effect on bilateral trade. Terrorist acts are 
directional since they are perpetrated against the interests of a targeted nation by 
individuals of a perpetrator nation on the soil of the targeted nation, the perpetrator 
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nation, or a third country. Hence terrorist acts have an impact on the bilateral trade 
relations between the targeted nation and the perpetrator nation, as well as between the 
neighbouring countries of the perpetrator nation and the targeted nation. Terrorist attacks 
also have a direct impact on the GDP of the targeted nation, and measures undertaken to 
fight terrorism impact bilateral trade. Moreover, the incidence of terrorist activity 
depends on the security measures undertaken to prevent it and on the extent to which 
modern economies are made vulnerable by their openness. To assess the impact of 
terrorism on bilateral trade, the global effect of trading with a terrorist country must be 
differentiated from the effect of bilateral terrorism on trade. Consequently, the 
endogeneity problems resulting from the effects of terrorism on GDP, and of security 
measures on terrorism must be taken into account. Mirza and Verdier (2008) single out 
the case of the impact of terrorism on imports to the United States (US) from countries in 
which terrorism against the US originates. In order to circumvent the problem created by 
the impact of security measures on bilateral trade, they use terrorist incidents targeting 
the US located in a third-SDUW\ FRXQWU\ QHLWKHU WKH86 QRU WKH SHUSHWUDWRU¶V FRXQWU\
They found that a 1% increase in terrorism UHGXFHV86 LPSRUWV IURP WKH SHUSHWUDWRU¶V
country by around 0.01 %.  
Modern maritime piracy differs from terrorism in several respects. Attacks occur on route 
instead of being directed against a particular country. According to Mejia and al (2009) 
pirates do not choose their targets according to the origin of the ships. They do, however, 
try to avoid ships sailing under the flag of a country with a naval force in the area 
(Kiourktsoglou and Coutroubis, 2010). Piracy may have a significant impact on GDP of 
the trading countries through a drop in trade, but its impact through asset destruction or 
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enhanced security measures is minimal. Conversely, the latter do have an impact on the 
amount and nature of piracy.  
Bendall (2010) and Fu & al (2010) analysed the impact of maritime piracy on the demand 
for shipping services between Europe and Asia. Both papers model the demand and cost 
of shipping services and make several assumptions vis-à-vis the key factors involved in 
the shipping business (load factor, manning costs, insurance costs, percentage of trade 
deviated in favour of the Cape route, efficiency of naval intervention). Bendall (2010) 
modelled a scenario in which all trade currently using the Suez route would be transferred 
to the Cape of Good Hope route, whereas Fu et al. (2010) assumed a transfer of 10 % of 
the total traffic to the alternative route. However, shipping companies only announced the 
development of new shipping lines from Europe to Asia passing around the Cape of Good 
Hope in 2008. This paper proposes a more direct approach for evaluating the impact of 
maritime piracy, as it does not require making assumptions as to the structure of the 
shipping industry. 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
3.1. A Geography of Maritime Trade and Piracy 
Our source of data on piracy incidents is the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Live 
Piracy Report. It provides data on all Piracy and Armed Robbery incidents reported to the 
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. The IMB is a specialized division of the International 
Chamber Of Commerce (ICC) established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight 
against all types of maritime crime and malpractice. Piracy suppression is one of the 
,0%¶VPDLQDUHDVRIH[SHUWLVHWKHDODUPLQJULVHLQLQFLGHQWVKDYLQJOHGWRWKHFUHDWLon of 
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the Kuala Lumpur-based IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in 1992. It maintains a round-the-
FORFN ZDWFK RYHU WKH ZRUOG¶V VKLSSLQJ ODQHV UHSRUWLQJ SLUDWH DWWDFNV WR ORFDO ODZ
enforcement agencies and issuing warnings about piracy hotspots to shippers.  
Figure 1 shows the main maritime routes in 2002. Most of the traffic connects the most 
economically powerful regions: North America-Europe, North America-Asia, and 
Europe-Asia. Routes linking Europe and Asia have the particularity of using specially 
narrow passages: the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bab el Mandab 
between Yemen and Djibouti and the Straits of Malacca between Sumatra and Malaysia. 
These passages suffer congestion problems and the countries flanking them are often 
politically unstable. 
Figure 1. Map of Maritime Shipping Routes in 2002 
In recent years, incidents of piracy acts have occurred in the vicinities of the Malacca and 
Bad el Mandab Straits, as well as in the Gulf of Aden along the shores of Somalia (See 
Figure 2). Somalia continues to endure a protracted civil war and is one of the most 
politically unstable countries in the world; the region of the Malacca Straits contains 
many small islands where the Indonesian government has no real control and which can 
be easily used by pirates as safe-havens. Merchandise being transported between Europe 
and Asia is, therefore, frequently endangered by piracy, be it in the Gulf of Aden or in 
Indonesian waters. 
Figure 2. Map of the Locations of Piracy Acts in 2008 
In order to examine the extent of the problem posed by piracy to shipping between 
Europe and Asia, and to determine differences in levels of danger by region, we have 
divided the oceans between the two continents into five regions: the European Seas (ES) 
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from the coastal areas of Iceland and Norway in the North to the waters of the Canary 
Islands in the South, in addition to the Mediterranean and Black Seas; the Red Sea and 
Gulf of Aden (RSGA) which includes a vast area of the Indian Ocean along the shores of 
Oman, Somalia and Tanzania; the Indian Sub-Continental Seas (ISBS) along the shore of 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Ceylon and the Maldives; the South-East-Asian Seas 
(SEAS) comprising the waters of Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as those of 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia; and lastly the East-Asian Seas 
(SEC) which encompasses the Yellow Sea between China and Korea, the East and South 
China Seas, and the Japanese coasts . 
Figure 3. Maritime Regions 
A ship heading from a port in northern Europe to China must cross all five maritime 
regions; four if it stops its journey in Singapore and three if it unloads its shipment in 
Mumbai. We have been able to count the number of incidents of piracy occurring 
annually in each of the five regions between 1997 and 2008, as well as the number of 
incidents on three different routes linking Europe and Asia over a 12-year period (see 
Table A.1 and Graph A.1 in the Appendix).  
We differentiate between three kinds of incident according to the extent to which the 
VKLS¶V MRXUQH\ LV GLVUXSWHG $WWHPSWHG DFWV RI SLUDF\ ERDUGLQJV DQG KLMDFNLQJV $Q
attempted piracy act occurs when pirates board a ship and abandon it empty-handed after 
being discovered, or in instances in which a ship is fired upon without being stopped. 
Instances of boardings entail actual boarding of a ship by pirates and theft (generally the 
personal belongings of the crew and/or goods carried for crew maintenance and en-route 
ship repairs). These incidents may involve violence against the crew. The last type of 
11  
  
piracy act, hijacking, consists in the seizure of the ship and its crew, the immobilization 
of the ship in a coastal area under the control of the pirates and a ransom being demanded 
in exchange for the crew members, the ship and its cargo. It is most obviously hijackings 
that are the most disruptive for maritime trade. Table 1 shows the quantitative evolution 
of piracy incidents over time. It is worth noting the sharp increase in hijackings in 2008 
in comparison to previous years. 
Table 1. Number of piracy acts by type on the Europe-East Asia Route 
3.2. Variables 
In this section we set out the variables used in our empirical work, focusing on our 
target variable: piracy incidents.  Sources and variable definitions are listed in Table A.2. 
Four of these variables concern piracy incidents: t_tot represents all piracy incidents 
(attempted boardings and successful ones) on a particular route, t_attempt is for all failed 
boarding attempts, t_boarded we use for incidents in which a ship has been boarded but 
not hijacked, and finally t_hijack stands for hijacked ships. We expect the t_tot to 
correlate negatively with bilateral maritime trade. Moreover, we expect that the more 
disruptive acts of piracy (hijackings) to have a greater negative impact on bilateral 
maritime trade. 
Our other variables are classical variables for gravity equations: distance (Distij), is 
expected to be negatively related to bilateral maritime trade, colonial links (Colonyij) and 
common official language (Comlang_off) are expected to be positively related to bilateral 
maritime trade. The GDPs per capita and populations of the importer and exporter (Yhi, 
Yhj and Popi, Popj respectively) are used as control variables as suggested in the gravity 
model literature. We expected GDPs per capita to be positively related to bilateral 
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maritime trade and populations to be negatively related to maritime trade. A summary of 
the statistics used is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Statistical Summary  
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
4.1. Model Specification 
The gravity model of trade is currently the most widely accepted framework for 
modelling bilateral trade flows (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). In it, bilateral trade levels are 
usually related to the nominal incomes and populations of the countries involved, to the 
distance between economic centres of both, and to a number of trade impediments and 
facilitation variables. Dummy variables, such as former colonies, common language, or a 
common border, are generally used as proxies for these factors. The gravity model has 
been widely used to investigate the role played by specific policy or geographical 
variables in bilateral trade flows. In this case we use incidents of piracy on a given route 
to augment the traditional model, adding alternatively to the trade hindering variables: 
number of piracy act attempts, ships boarded, hijackings or total number of incidents. 
Introducing time variation the augmented gravity model is specified as 
 (1),                                    
where Xijt are the exports from country i to country j in period t in current US$; YHi (YHj) 
indicates the GDP per capita of the exporter (importer), Popi (Popj) expresses exporter 
(importer) populations, Distij is geographical distances between countries i and j, and Fij 
represents other factors hindering or facilitating trade (e.g., common language, a colonial 
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relationship, or being landlocked). Piracyijt is the number of piracy incidents on the trade 
route linking the two countries i and j. 
Lags are included in the model along with piracy variables, as incidents of piracy will 
affect decisions for shipping in the following years. In this manner we hope to avoid 
inverse causality issues, as incidents of piracy may be expected to be higher in crowded 
sea lanes, where traffic is dense and the possibilities for attacking vessels are greater.  
The model is generally estimated in log-linear form. Using logarithms for 
Equation 1, the gravity model is specified as follows. 
                 (2), 
where L expresses variables in natural logs, the other explanatory variables having been 
described above. 
t are specific time effects that control for omitted variables common to all trade 
flows but which vary over time, they could be a proxy for the business cycle. įij are 
trading-partner fixed effects that proxy for multilateral resistance factors. When these 
effects are specified as fixed effects, the influence of the variables that are time invariant 
cannot be directly estimated. This is the case for distance; common language, colonial 
links and landlocked countries- therefore, its effect is subsumed into the country 
dummies. Since the variable of interest is piracy incidents, and variability is mainly over 
time, in some estimations we replace the time dummies by a trend.  
Considering that it may take some time before insecurity fully affects trade, we 
include the second lag for the different types of piracy incidents in our model.  
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Continuing with our analysis we consider a modification to include the value of 
air trade as an additional regressor. This second specification which accounts for air trade 
in a panel data framework is given by 
 
               (3), 
where LXairij is the value in US$ of air trade between i and j in year t, and İijt expresses 
the error term that is assumed to be well behaved. The other variables are the same as in 
Equation 2, above. 
Finally, we estimate Model 3 for each specific route, to investigate whether the number of 
incidents has a different impact on each route. 
4.2. Main results 
Models 1 and 2 are estimated for annual exports from 27 European Union (EU) countries 
to 20 Asian countries and Australia (Table A.3) for a 12 year period (1997-2008). Table 3 
shows the results obtained when equation 2 is estimated for all trade routes with 
hijackings as the target variable. Preliminary results indicate that the only variable that is 
statistically significant is the number of hijackings, whereas the number of attempts, 
number of boarded vessels and total number of incidents are not statistically significant 
for all specifications. We were not able to control for time effects common to all trade 
flows in the results for all trade routes (Table 3) because they are collinear with the 
number of incidents, for which the main source of variability is over time.  
After trying different specifications, it was the second lag of the number of hijacks that 
was found to be most relevant, further lags not being statistically significant. The model 
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was first estimated using simple OLS for the pooled data (Baseline) and using random 
(M1) and fixed effects (M2) for each specific trading pair. As possible refinements we 
also estimated a fixed effect model corrected for autocorrelation (M3), another fixed 
effect model with standard errors corrected also for spatial cross-correlations (M4) and 
two dynamic models estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM): one 
estimated with the variables in levels (M5) and a second model with the variables in first 
differences (M6). A Hausman test indicates that the country-pair effects are correlated 
with the error term and therefore only the fixed effects specification is consistent. 
In all models, the coefficient estimated for the number of hijacks is negative and 
statistically significant at standard levels. As expected, an increase in number of attacks 
hinders exports. Since the results in models 5 and 6 indicate that the coefficient on lagged 
exports is not statistically significant, our preferred results are those of Model 5, with 
dyadic fixed effects and controlling for autocorrelation and spatial correlation in the 
residuals. According to the results obtained in Table 3, the effect of one additional vessel 
hijacked is associated with a decrease in exports of about 1.1% (M4). We also tried with 
export volumes instead of export value, obtaining results similar in magnitude and 
significance. 
Table 3. Baseline results for all trade routes  
In Table 4, we present the results obtained by estimating Equation 3, which includes the 
value of air freight as additional regressor. The estimated coefficient for lxva is not 
statistically significant in the models specified with fixed effects, only in the OLS 
baseline model and in M1, estimated with random effects, is the coefficient negative and 
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statistically significant. The coefficient of our target variable, namely piracy, remains 
unchanged. 
Table 4. Break-down of results by specific Trade route (Equation 3) 
Table 5 present the results for each maritime route, we can observe that impact is greatest 
on the route linking Europe to the Sub-Continent, which only includes vessels hijacked in 
regions ES, RGSA and ISCS. 
Table 5. Results by maritime route 
The greater effect of piracy on the Indo-European trade route is hardly surprising when 
the geographical position of the Indian Sub-continent and the recent history of piracy 
events in the region are considered. Because of its geographic position, it may be difficult 
for ships set to the west coast of India not to break from the corridor established to 
protect the merchant vessels before reaching safe water. This has become all the more 
true as in 2008 and 2009 Somali Pirates broadened the reach of their operations to 
encompass much of the Indian Ocean, practically reaching the Maldives Islands (Report 
of the House of Lords p.11). According to the IMB, 2009 saw an important shift in the 
location of attacks by Somali pirates. While in 2008 attacks were mainly in the Gulf of 
Aden, in 2009 they were concentrated along the Somali sea-board. 
Figure 4. The Operating area of the Somali Pirates: The Suez Canal and Cape 
Maritime Routes 
5. DISCUSSION: TRADE LOSS DUE TO MARITIME PIRACY 
In this section we illustrate our findings by evaluating trade losses due to maritime piracy, 
(Table 6) differentiating between the loss due to piracy in the Somali region and that in 
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the Malacca strait region (Table 7). This should allow us to add evidence about divergent 
behaviours according to the region of action of pirates (Hastings 2009) and concerning 
the consequences of piracy in terms of international cooperation (Christoffersen 2009; 
Dela Pena 2009).  
Table 6. Total Maritime Trade and Loss of Trade due to Maritime Piracy 
Table 6 provides an evaluation of trade losses due to maritime modern piracy for the 
1999-2008 period. Having linearized the progression of maritime piracy incidents (3.4 
additional vessels hijacked each year between 1999 and 2008), we found that the trade 
loss due to maritime piracy between Europe and Asia amounted to 24.5 billion dollars in 
2008. 
Table 7. Loss of trade on the East Asian Trade Route due to Piracy 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show the percentage of piracy acts involving Somali 
pirate hijackings and those due to Malaccan pirates on the Europe-East Asia trade route. 
The figures show a diverging trend over time. A sharp increase of the percentage of 
hijackings by Somali pirates is observed over time, together with an important drop in 
hijackings by Malaccan pirates. Respective trade losses due to these acts are shown in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 7. The evidence indicates that only since 2005 does the trade 
loss caused by Somali pirates exceed that caused by Malaccan Pirates. This may be 
H[SODLQHGE\ WKHREVHUYHG LQFUHDVH LQ WKHSHUFHQWDJHRI ³VXFFHVVIXO´SLUDF\DFWV LQ WKH
Gulf of Aden and the simultaneous decrease of this figure in the Malacca Strait. 
Maritime piracy emerged in the Malaccan Strait in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian 
crisis. Security in the straits suffered from the lack of naval capacity of the Indonesian 
government to police its own waters and from the impoverishment of local fishing 
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communities. Countries such as Japan, with vital economic interest in the safe passage of 
ships through the Straits, grew increasingly worried about the consequences of maritime 
piracy acts for trade (Dela Pena 2009). Through multinational and bilateral initiatives, 
Asian countries have improved the security in the Straits of Malacca. In 2004, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore agreed to set up joint maritime patrols (operation MALSINDO) 
and air surveillance of the Strait (operation EIS). These two operations, in addition to 
financial and material support provided by Japan and the USA to the Indonesian navy the 
following years, seem to have curbed piracy acts in the Straits of Malacca. However, it is 
impossible to rule out that improving living condition for the fishing communities along 
the Straits has not played a role in the decrease in piracy acts. 
The danger from Somali piracy has taken longer to materialize: Somalia has been 
without a functioning government since 1991 (Leeson 2008; Powell et al 2008), but only 
since 2005 has the number of major piracy acts undergone a rapid increase. In 2008, the 
commitment of the international community to eliminate maritime piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden was ensured through several Security Council decisions1. As in the Strait of 
Malacca, air surveillance operations and naval patrols have been put in place (USA task 
force 151, European Union¶V Operation Atalanta, and operations by the Chinese and 
Indian navies). However, no drop in piracy acts in the Gulf of Aden has been observed so 
far. The difficulty in finding potential partners in Somalia to deal with pirates on land and 
the fact that piracy is almost the only source of income for Somali coastal communities 
seem to be the main reasons. 
A topic for further research could be the assessment of the costs and the benefits of 
the mobilization of military assets in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca against 
                                                                                                            
1  Security Council Resolution 1814, 1816, 1838 and 1846.  
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the loss of trade due to maritime piracy. At present, however, the difficulty in finding 
accurate information on the cost of the various military operations in place puts this task 
beyond our reach. 
6. Conclusions 
We have applied a gravity model to annual exports from 27 EU countries to 21 
destinations. The effects of piracy incidents were captured by the number of attempts, the 
number of boarded vessels and the number of hijacked vessels in the three maritime 
routes considered. Two main conclusions emerged. First, not all acts of violence against 
ships hinder international maritime trade, only the most harmful (hijackings) of these 
lower the amount of trade between nations. Second, as most of the incidents of piracy 
involving hijacking are attributed to Somali pirates, it seems reasonable to say that, were 
piracy to disappear in the Gulf of Aden (RSGA region), there would be a slight drop in 
the cost of maritime trade between Asia and Europe. Third, air freight does not appear to 
be a substitute for maritime trade; this result is preliminary, as estimates for different type 
of goods need to be calculated. 
Interestingly, it appears to be the case, that rather than eradicating piracy, the 
International Community has decided to contain it. According to the Commander in chief 
of the joint European Naval Task Force, the naval forces are in a position to deter, rather 
than fully eradicate, piracy, due to the vast expanse of ocean in which the pirates operate, 
as it is impossible to intercept systematically all attempts of piracy. An alternative 
solution would be to send ground forces onto the Somali shore. This option has been 
ruled out because of the human and economic cost it would entail, as demonstrated 18 
\HDUVDJRZLWKWKH86OHDGRSHUDWLRQ³5HVWRUH+RSH´<HWDQRWKHUVROXWLRQZRXOGEHWR
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revive an active gunboat policy on the Somali ports such as Eyl and Garacad, which are 
known to be used by pirates. Although this may seem less expensive and more feasible, 
with modern war faring techniques, it would be to ignore a key fact in the current Somali 
political situation: pirates are one of the few organized forces capable of opposing the 
Islamist militia that rules a vast part of the country (Percy and Shortland, 2009). 
Weakening the pirates and the two proto-states largely living off the spoils of piracy, 
could lead to a power vacuum in the regions where the Islamist militias are less active. 
An alternative manageable solution for the International community may be to provide 
strong backing for one of the new Somali proto-states, and start a program for recycling 
pirates as pirate-fighting coast guards. This solution would have the advantage of being 
relatively cheap and creating an area of stability in a strategic region for International 
trade. 
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Figure 1. Maritime Shipping Routes in 2002 
 
 
 
  
Source: http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/. Rodrigue, Jean-Paul. Department of Global Studies and 
Geography, Hofstra University, New York. 
  
Figure 2. Location of piracy acts in 2008 
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Source: IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC Commercial Crime Services, 
London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
  
Figure 3. Maritime regions 
 
 
 
Source: Self-created using data from IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC 
Commercial Crime Services, London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
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Figure 4. Range of Action of the Somali Pirates. Suez Canal and Cape Maritime 
Routes 
 
 
Source: Self-created using data from IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC 
Commercial Crime Services, London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
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Table 1. Acts of piracy on the Europe- South East Asia Route by type  
 
Year   Type of incidents 
boarded hijacked attempt Total 
1997 100 15 23 138 
1998 90 14 31 135 
1999 169 12 46 227 
2000 235 6 130 371 
2001 145 18 75 238 
2002 152 26 60 238 
2003 180 17 88 285 
2004 134 9 63 206 
2005 111 23 59 193 
2006 104 13 50 167 
2007 98 13 56 167 
2008 81 46 80 207 
2009 153 49 84 406 
6RXUFH$XWKRUV¶ RZQ FDOFXODWLRQV XVLQJ GDWD IURP WKH ,0% 3LUDF\ 5HSRUWLQJ &HQWHU WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Maritime Bureau, and the ICC Commercial Crime Services, London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org. 
 
  
 
Table 2. Statistical Summary 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LX 4755 16.22 3.17 3.74 23.91 
LXAair 5171 15.15 3.68 0.69 22.88 
LYHi 5628 9.71 0.90 7.35 11.62 
LYHj 5130 7.64 1.65 5.35 10.77 
LPOPi 5670 15.88 1.43 12.87 18.23 
LPOPj 5400 17.55 1.79 13.21 21.01 
LDist 5670 9.03 0.25 8.20 9.81 
T_HIJACK 5670 15.66667 11.76795 1 46 
T_BOARDED 5670 113.8111 57.0805 34 246 
T_ATTEMPT 5670 58.73704 28.63038 12 137 
T_TOT 5670 188.2148 83.50224 48 391 
Note: L represents natural logarithms, X and LXair the value of maritime and air trade respectively; YHi 
and YHj express per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of exporter and importer countries; Popi and 
Popj are the respective populations; Dist is distance between countries; T_HIJACK, T_BOARDED and 
T_ATTEMPT is the total number of ships hijacked, boarded and suffering attempts of piracy.  
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Table 3. Baseline results for all trade routes  
   OLS RE FE FE,AR(1) FE, Spatial 
C. 
GMM,FE GMM,FD 
   Baseline M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
   b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
LYHi 1.125*** 0.813*** 0.627*** 0.389*** 0.627*** 0.415*** 0.356 
   55.039 19.826 4.611 2.67 4.183 2.7 1.641 
LYHj 1.281*** 0.614*** 0.863*** 0.531*** 0.863*** 0.416*** 0.226 
   37.406 13.025 8.541 3.818 11.703 2.8 0.84 
LPOPi 0.896*** 0.859*** -2.081** 0.232 -2.081* 0.04 0.235 
   50.227 21.736 -2.408 0.989 -1.828 0.045 0.124 
LPOPj 1.156*** 1.127*** -4.388*** 0.157 -4.388*** -3.065*** -6.015**  
   64.268 23.874 -4.532 0.631 -5.355 -2.881 -2.346 
LDist -0.351*** 0.994***              
   -3.231 3.476              
L2.T_HIJACK -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.005** -0.004**  
   -3.37 -5.363 -4.09 -3.041 -5.736 -2.244 -2.135 
COMLANG_OFF 0.492*** 0.864**              
   3.884 2.345              
COLONY 0.510*** 0.697              
   5.052 1.586              
L.LX                0.197 -0.046 
                  1.409 -0.463 
CONSTANT -36.196*** -38.355*** 110.107*** 1.614***       0.066 
   -33.681 -13.667 5.801 3.623       1.265 
R2 WITHIN    0.739 0.152       0.145 0.023 
R2 0.777    0.231 0.312         
Nobs 3494 3494 3494 3003 3494 2802 2377 
LL -6344.085    -3978.446 -3113.288    -2596.522 -2837.674 
RMSE 1.489 0.847 0.816 0.683    0.664 0.798 
Hansen test                2.288 1.455 
Probab.                0.130 0.228 
AIC 12708.170 . 7968.891 6238.576 . 5205.044 5689.348 
BIC 12769.76 . 8005.844 6274.62 . 5240.672 5729.763 
Note: t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. L is for natural logarithms, X and LXair are the 
value of maritime and air trade; and YHi and YHj are per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of exporter 
and importer countries respectively; Popi and Popj are country populations; Dist is distance between 
countries; T_HIJACK, the total number of ships hijacked. COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL are dummy 
variables that take the value of one when the countries have a common official language and when they had 
a colonial relationship in the past, respectively; L2. is the appropriate variable in year t-2 (second lag) and 
L. is for year t-1 (first lag). FD indicates that the model has been estimated with the respective variable in 
first differences. 
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Table 4. Break-down by specific Trade route (Equation 3) 
   OLS  RE  FE  FE,AR(1) FE, Spatial 
C. 
GMM,FE  GMM,FD  
   Baseline M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6  
   b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
LYHi 1.122*** 0.818*** 0.636*** 0.563*** 0.636*** 0.463*** 0.36 
   52.786 19.465 4.6 4.014 3.431 2.983 1.588 
LYHj 1.279*** 0.629*** 0.845*** 0.303** 0.845*** 0.401*** 0.217 
   37.092 12.947 8.086 2.22 10.33 2.652 0.808 
LPOPi 0.865*** 0.862*** -2.137** 0.536*** -2.137** -0.172 0.099 
   44.836 20.239 -2.385 2.856 -2.087 -0.184 0.05 
LPOPj 1.189*** 1.150*** -4.279*** -0.096 -4.279*** -2.958** -5.194* 
   64.764 23.651 -4.185 -0.471 -4.414 -2.551 -1.912 
LDist -0.398*** 1.032***               
   -3.437 3.47               
L2.T_HIJACK -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.005** -0.010*** -0.005** -0.005** 
   -3.359 -5.028 -3.651 -2.44 -6.719 -2.32 -2.233 
COMLANG_OFF 0.499*** 0.783**               
   3.808 2.088               
COLONY 0.363*** 0.572               
   3.482 1.28               
LXAir -0.024*** -0.043*** 0 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 
   -2.983 -3.445 0.031 -0.325 0.04 -0.016 0.312 
L.LX                0.192 -0.024 
                  1.405 -0.217 
CONSTANT -35.284*** -38.628*** 109.616*** 1.306***    0.063   
   -30.989 -13.118 5.593 4.13    1.145   
R2 WITHIN       0.152       0.145 0.023 
R2 0.777 0.739 0.231 0.312         
Nobs 3298 3298 3298 2818 3298 2658 2215 
LL -5925.716    -3685.382 -2826.735    -2408.501 -2614.256 
RMSE 1.461 0.829 0.801 0.661    0.652 0.788 
Hansen test                2.322 1.963 
Probab.                0.128 0.161 
AIC 11871.43 . 7384.764 5667.471 . 4831.003 5244.511 
BIC 11932.44 . 7427.472 5709.077 . 4872.2 5290.136 
Note: t-statistics were calculated using robust standard errors. L indicates natural logarithms, X and LXair 
express the value of maritime and air trade; and YHi and YHj are for per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the exporter and importer countries; Popi and Popj express country populations; Dist is distance 
between countries; T_HIJACK is the total number of ships hijacked. COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL 
are dummy variables that take the value of one when the countries have a common official language and 
when they had a colonial relationship in the past, respectively; L2. expresses the respective variable in year 
t-2 (second lag) and L. the variable in year t-1 (first lag). FD means that the model has been estimated with 
the respective variable in first differences. 
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Table 5. Results by maritime route 
FE with ar(1) and spatial 
correlations 
Europe - Indian Sub Continent 
 M1 
Europe - South East Asia 
 M2 
Europe - East Asia  
M3 
   b/t b/t b/t 
LYHi 0.584*** 0.423** 1.095*** 
   3.322 2.246 4.198 
LYHj 1.544*** 0.344** 0.827*** 
   10.21 2.172 8.209 
LPOPi -6.333*** 2.982*** -12.538** 
   -8.853 4.027 -2.556 
LPOPj -3.980** -6.689*** -0.091 
   -2.198 -5.982 -0.085 
L2.T_HIJACK -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.006** 
   -10.177 -5.085 -2.244 
LXAir 0.005 -0.007 0.001 
   0.219 -0.422 0.061 
CONSTANT 174.326*** 64.604*** 230.347** 
   8.569 3.356 2.314 
R2_WITHIN 0.182 0.115 0.239 
Nobs 1116 1427 755 
           
Note: t-statistics are reported, calculated using robust standard errors. L expresses natural logarithms, X and 
LXair represents the value of maritime and air trade respectively; and YHi and YHj are for per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) of the exporter and the importer country respectively; Popi and Popj express the 
respective populations; Dist is distance between countries; T_HIJACK, is the total number of ships 
hijacked. COMLANG_OFF and COLONIAL are dummy variables that take the value of one when the 
countries have a common official language and when they had a colonial relationship in the past, 
respectively; L2. means it is the variable in year t-2 (second lag). 
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Table 6. Total Maritime Trade and Loss of Trade due to Maritime Piracy 
year Total Maritime trade * (Millions USD) Loss of Trade ** (Millions USD) 
1999 $279,000  $10,600  
2000 $337,000  $12,800  
2001 $341,000  $13,000  
2002 $343,000  $13,100  
2003 $356,000  $13,600  
2004 $403,000  $15,400  
2005 $448,000  $17,100  
2006 $519,000  $19,800  
2007 $598,000  $22,800  
2008 $643,000  $24,500  
 
*Calculated for all the country pairs in our sample and for the Europe-Asia trade route. 
** Only piracy acts involving maritime piracy are taken in account; we have proceed flowingly to calculate 
the loss of trade due to maritime piracy: The average increase in t_hijacks over the period 1999 to 2008 is 
3.4 vessels; this increase has reduced exports on average by:  
Ψ׏ ෠ܺ ൌ ͳͲͲ כ ൣ൫ߙො଺ο ுܶ௜௝௔௖௞൯ െ ͳ൧ ൌ100* ሾሺͲǤͲͳͳ כ ͵ǤͶሻ െ ͳሿ ൌ ͵Ǥͺͳ% 
Cost2008= 0.0381*   642594927127= 24482866723.  
 
 
Table 7. Loss of trade on the East Asian Trade Route due to Piracy 
 
Year Percent of hijacking Loss of trade (Millions USD) 
 Somali Pirates Malaccan Pirates Somali Pirates Malaccan Pirates 
1999 42% 58% $3,840  $5,370  
2000 13% 38% $1,390  $4,170  
2001 16% 68% $1,770  $7,690  
2002 11% 79% $1,210  $8,870  
2003 6% 72% $651  $8,460  
2004 0% 80% $0  $10,600  
2005 65% 35% $9,510  $5,070  
2006 38% 38% $6,490  $6,490  
2007 92% 8% $18,000  $1,500  
2008 91% 9% $19,000  $1,810  
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APPENDIX 1  
Graph A1. Total number of incidents on the three maritime routes. 
 
 
 
Source: IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC Commercial Crime Services, 
London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table A1. Maritime Region Navigated according to each trade route. 
Maritime Route   Maritime regions navigated 
European Seas 
(ES) 
Red Sea/ Gulf 
of Aden 
(RGSA) 
Indian Sub 
Continental 
Seas (ISCS) 
South East 
Asian Seas 
(SEAS) 
East Asian 
Seas (SEC) 
Europe - Indian Sub 
Continent 
X X X      
Europe - South East Asia X X X X   
Europe - East Asia X X X X X 
6RXUFH$XWKRUV¶RZQHODERUDWLRQ 
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APPENDIX 3 
Table A.2 Sources and variables 
Dependent Variables Description Source 
Xij : Maritime Exports from i to j Nominal X Eurostat 
Independent Variables Description Source 
Yi ([SRUWHU¶VLQFRPH ([SRUWHU¶V*'3333FXUUHQW WDI 
Yj ,PSRUWHU¶VLQFRPH ,PSRUWHU¶V*'3333FXUUHQW WDI 
t_boarded number of ships boarded by pirates 
on a particular route 
IMB 
t_hijack number of ships hijacked by pirates 
on a particular route 
IMB 
t_attempt number of attempted piracy acts on 
a particular route 
IMB 
t_tot number of piracy acts on a 
particular route 
IMB 
Distij : Distance Distances between country capitals 
of trading partners (km) 
CEPII  
Comlang_off Dummy variable = 1 if the trading 
partners share the same official 
language 
CEPII  
Colonyij :  Dummy variable = 1 if the trading 
partners had colonial links in the 
past, 0 otherwise 
CEPII  
Note: WDI denotes the World Bank Indicators, IBM denotes the International Maritime Bureau and CEPII 
the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Table A3. List of exporter and importer countries 
European Countries Asian Countries and Australia 
AUSTRIA AUSTRALIA 
BELGIUM (and LUXBG -> 1998) BANGLADESH 
BULGARIA BHUTAN 
CYPRUS CAMBODIA (ex KAMPUCHEA) 
CZECH REPUBLIC (CS->1992) CHINA (PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF) 
DENMARK HONG KONG 
ESTONIA INDIA 
FINLAND INDONESIA (ID+TP from 77,excl. TP -> 2001) 
FRANCE JAPAN 
GERMANY (incl. DD from 1991) KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH KOREA) 
GREECE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LAOS) 
HUNGARY MALAYSIA 
IRELAND MYANMAR (BURMA) 
ITALY NEPAL 
LATVIA PAKISTAN 
LITHUANIA PHILIPPINES 
LUXEMBOURG SINGAPORE 
MALTA SRI LANKA (ex CEYLAN) 
NETHERLANDS TAIWAN 
POLAND THAILAND 
PORTUGAL VIETNAM (excl. NORTH -> 1976) 
ROMANIA   
SLOVAKIA   
SLOVENIA   
SPAIN   
SWEDEN   
UNITED KINGDOM   
 
 
